First, the numbers

United are passing long much more than last season, indicating a much more direct intent.

Long passes attempted (%):
- 2024/2025: 11.9%
- 2025/2026: 20.1%

Total passes are down, at the expense of fewer short passes.

These are not just the random, panic-induced long passes that we’ve often seen last season.

Success rate also went up from 51% to 56%, and United now lead the league in completed long passes:

The volume going up + the success rate going up as well clearly indicated this is intentional and not a by-product of top teams pressing us more.

I predicted this might be the intent during the summer, when it became clear new forwards were our primary targets.

As I wrote back then, new forwards were about build-up as much as they were about finishing.

Amorim wanted 10s who could receive under pressure & stretch defenses, and a CF who could win aerial duels and offer good hold-up and link-up play.

And you can clearly see it in the games. Bayindir passing directly to Cunha for a fantastic chance against Fulham. Sesko flicking it on to Mbeumo, for red card against Chelsea. Bruno pinging diagonal passes. Yoro, Shaw, MDL passing long & up the pitch rather than retaining.

That’s why long passes have gone up by 2x, as % of all passes 📈

And since we try to go long much more often and sooner than before, touches per 90 in United’s own 3rd went down dramatically:

- 2024/2025: 226.1 (1st in PL)
- 2025/2026: 175 (18th in the PL)

United’s new transitional intent with longer passing and focus on 2nd balls is also reflected in 40% more aerial duels per 90:

- 2024/2025: 25.6
- 2025/2026: 35.4

This new verticality has led to a sharp increase in number of shots, entries and xG per game.

Since those chances come as end products of attacks that consist of long passes, sprints & 2nd ball duels, they don’t lead to many shots on target nor goals.

This is where the questions start

- can this work against teams with compact mid and low blocks?
- is it physically sustainable, esp. when paired with our OOP approach?
- can a good m2m press stop 1st phase progression before we go long?

It’s undeniable we managed to progress better and create more. But did we really manage to hurt the top teams we faced?

There were good phases in each game, but it took a red card against Chelsea to record our first win, for a 1W 2L record, with a 2-6 goal difference.

I suspect the real benefit was not getting caught in our own half, during our own build up. This was a major problem for Amorim last season.

Bypassing the press to get into more dangerous areas right away also means not having to deal with turnovers close to own goal.

A temporary tactic or the blueprint

Was going long just a by-product of facing great teams? Don’t think so, based on games against Fulham and Burnley. And as seen in those games, the physical demads are very high and not sustainable.

Based on Amorim’s recent comments about United being a transitional team, our activity in the market and intent on display so far this season, don’t think this is not only a “big game” tactic.

It’s the general blueprint.

More verticality can be a great thing, especially if it’s controlled and the team understands when to go long. But it needs to be paired with other tools and approaches, like being able to build through midfield, keep the ball in final 3rd and manipulate settled blocks.

If space can be found, great. But space sometimes has to be created. If a team presses high or holds a high line, space is there to be found, if you can find it.

But if a team stays compact, space has to be createe before it can be found.

That’s where United have struggled so far, same as under ETH. It should be noted that ETH also sought more verticality and directness as a solution to many problems. But solutions are rarely as simple.

And then there are the out-of-possession issues, exploited by Fulham. Since we tend to use a 5-2-3 block in which the CBs and CMs have to man-mark, it’s easy for teams to manipulate it and overload our midfield. Which is exactly what Fulham did for most of the game, using Iwobi as an outlet between our forwards and midfielders, bypassing 6-7 players with 1-2 passes.

In short:

- Ars pressed from a high block, but were slightly passive & disorganized, leaving our WBs unmarked in the 1st half
- Ars took an early lead and were content to sit back & concede territory, as Ars do
- Fulham made an adjustment after 15 mins to match our 3-4-3 shape & overload midfield areas (mostly through Iwobi)
- Fulham forced us long or sideways, not taking the bait to allow us to build
- Grimsby used an aggressive M2M press, risky & imperfect, but effective enough

There is no grand conspiracy nor a magical explanation. This is how United have played for months now, with the exact same flaws and issues. People with poor tactical understanding are always inclined to use player mentality or lack of quality as the explanation for everything. 

Mentality surely plays a role - if you’ve been one of the worst teams in top 5 leagues for 9 months, it takes a toll. But the #1 problem here is a tactical system that even a League Two club was able to exploit. There are no new players that can mask this fact.

Unless Amorim makes radical changes immediately, the end is near.

Issue 2: Ugarte too deep to press anyone

Here is Manuel Ugarte, positioned very deep, which makes this almost a flat 6.

He’s not covering anyone in particular, as Yoro is on Soucek behind him.

Look at the distance between him and any opposition player he might be expected to pressure!

So, the initial block is basically a a 6v3, flat and passive, with our flanks mostly open.

As WH progress the ball wide, Amad is a bit slow to react here, but makes it up (he likes to let players receive).

Bruno follows through to apply pressure, and forces WH back.

Issue 3: Cunha slow to step up

As Bruno and Hojlund burst forward to press, Cunha is very slow to react and get his man. This is a well-known weakness in his game.

He might also be reluctant to step up, because Dorgu is staying back, Heaven is occupied & WH have nummerical advantage on this side.

Issue 4: Soucek’s run goes unmarked

Soucek begins his diagonal run. He is initially marked by Yoro, who doesn’t follow him and nobody picks him up.

He’ll be running completelty unmarked and have acres of space to receive, turn, carry and pass. Ugarte is still ball-watching at this point.

Issue 5: Ward-Prowse arrives behind

The ball now goes back the GK and Cunha finally steps up to mark Todibo. But then he stops for a moment and hesitates.

The next frame might indicate why - there is Ward-Prowse arriving behind him, unmarked.

Issue 6: Ugarte overcommits

At one point Ugarte noticed Ward-Prowse’s run and is now running to mark him. But his initial position was too deep and he’s too late.

He doesn’t notice Soucek is making that same diagonal run behind him, and will soon have the entire central midfield to himself.

This combination of arriving late & not being aware of the runner behind him means Ugarte overcommits and bumps into Ward-Prowse.

Instead of positioning himself to block the passing lane to Soucek, ready to jump at WP if needed, he’s all in on WP.

WP even does a slight right jump, as a feint to free up the inside passing lane, but Ugarte doesn’t pick up on it, and stays too close on him.

Mainoo moves inside, but slightly, not enough to block the pass.

This is the problem with a flat block consiting of 5 at the back + DM in front of them. It’s very hard to transition from that into a more active position.

Ugarte should have been on Ward-Prowse much earlier, and one of the CBs should have been following Soucek.

When the pass is executed, Soucek is completely alone and WH can have a free run at our back line.

Our front 5 are bypassed and that’s it.

In short:
- passive starting position with a flat 5 atb + DM in front
- as front press is initated, CBs, WBs and CMs running from deep positions
- players unsure whom to pick up and mark as runs begin
- e.g. Yoro not following Soucek since his run is diagonal, not linear, nobody picks him up
- individual errors in following play and applying pressure (Ugarte, Cunha…)
- CBs reluctant to push up beyond halfway line, gaps between lines
- gaps once front press is bypassed

It’s not just about individual errors - it’s also structural, which seems to contribute to confusion and mistakes.

And it’s been evident for a while. West Ham only exploited it once, but better teams will enjoy exploiting it.

Plainly speaking, United lack a player in midfield.

Therefore, they must come up with ways to compensate for it, through aggressive WBs or adopting a 4atb block.

Imho, United should drop the flat 5atb block, in favor of a more aggressive 4atb structure.

Alternatively, for some games or game states, they could also use a compact 5-4-1 block.

But this combo of staying flat at the back with sporadic attemps at high pressing, has been bad.

What Amorim is trying to do

Firstly, what is Amorim trying to do? The macro idea is to lure opposition to press centrally, which opens up wide areas for progression.

Here, you can see Maguire acting as a decoy to attract pressure, allowing Onana to go short to WCBs or long to WBs.

📷 credit: @EBL2017

Alternatively, the GK might launch it directly to the CF, to bypass the front press and keeps teams guessing.

We’ve seen plenty of that, with Onana’s recording career-highs in goal kick avg. length and % of kicks launched long.

Look at the difference vs Ajax & Inter years!

Either way, the intention is not to build directly through the CCB. Rather, it is to go around or over the block.

The CCB might receive and play a bounce pass - but his primary aim is to give an extra target for the opposition to mark in central midfield areas.

It has been a tremendous failure.

As many analysts on here have noted, right from Amorim’s start at United, you simply can’t afford to sacrifice one player during build up in the PL.

There are other ways Amorim is trying to execute on his macro idea of luring the opposition centrally to play around or over the block.

But it’s not working at all. Why?

The difference is in the pressing

My theory is simple: there are vast, fundamental differences between quality of OOP play in the PL and most other leagues, Portugese Primeira Liga included.

And nowhere is this more apparent than in pressing quality & intent, as observed through the so-called PPDA stat.

Here is the average PPDA (pass per defensive action) in the PL last season. Remember, lower is better:

And here the PPDA in the Primeira Liga, in 23/24, Amorim’s last full season:

The average for PL is 9.8, while the average for Primeira is 12.1, indicating a 23% jump in pressing effectiveness and aggressiveness.

But it’s even more interesting to take a deeper look at top teams here.

The best pressing team in Portugal was Porto, with a PPDA of 8.7.

Well… there were 9 teams better than that the PL last season!

So if Amorim had to face an excellent pressing team twice per season, now he has to do it 16 -18 times per year (one of the teams was United).

In other words: 5% of league games in Portugal came against teams with a PPDA lower than 9. In the PL, it’s 47%!

There are vast, material differences in how opposition teams approach your build up - and what you are able to do against them.

I think it was @Jon_Mackenzie who said that the general level of OOP play was the thing that coaches from other leagues struggle with the most.

This seems to the happening here, as well. Amorim has to adjust his intent in order to build attacks against PL teams.

As I wrote back in May, the crux of the matter with Amorim is: are ideas good enough while the execution failed, or do his ideas need improving as well?

Nowhere is this as evident as in build up.

It’s not like Rashford is the only asset we messed up with.

2. United obviously didn’t do enough to develop Rashford. His initial promise was greater than the product we ended up with, with only occassional hints of his brilliance.

This is mostly due to constant changes in managers, game models, tactics, roles and duties, but also a good amount of misprofiling and a lack of compatibility with immediate teammates.

When Rashford had a CF and LB he could play with, he usually thrived. When he was used as an attacking outlet, he usually thrived.

3. Rashford - and others players - had to go through countless managers, game models, corporate upheavals, club restarts and other emotional rollecoasters.

It’s been sheer chaos, a maelstorm of constant change, insecurity, fan anger & ferocious anxiety. It’s taken a toll for sure.

4. After his best season at United - ETH’s first one im charge - Rashford’s role was dramatically changed yet again, and his naturally output collapsed.

But all you could read about was his alleged lack of effort and lack of goals, with a complete disregard for changes in the tactical context.

How was he supposed to stay super-motivated? He had just had a dream season and saw his role changed, yet again, in a way that highlighted his flaws and failed to use his strengths.

5. If there had been off-field issues, and there seem to have been quite a few, can you really claim it had nothing to do with the total professional chaos the boy was brought up in?

It’s not like Rashford is completely innocent, but the club did all it could to provide him with a terrible environment to develop, grow and succeed. Over and over again.

But on a broader cultural level, this represents a devastating defeat for Manchester United. And it’s a brutal verdict on how the club was ran for 10 years.

Clubs sell players. Club sell their academy players. Clubs even sell their best academy players. But not United. And not Rashford. With Rashford and United, it really wasn’t supposed to end this way.